The cognitive operation of conceptual integration or blending as described by Fauconnier and Turner (1994,1996) includes the notion ofemergent structure, that is to say, conceptual structure, which is part of the blend and which is independent and/or inconsistent with that of the input spaces. Emergent structure is especially noticeable in counterfactual pieces of advice of the type Iflwereyou, Iwould..., which involve the construction of a mental space which is contrary-to-fact with respect to both input spaces. Nevertheless, as argued by Ruiz de Mendoza (1998), this type of blend-internal asymmetries and inconsistencies are litüe desirable from the point of view of cognitive economy. In connection with this observation, this paper attempts to reanalyse and explain the performance of conterfactual advising by adequately combining data from as many input spaces as necessary to yield implicated information. In doing so, our account is free from the cognitive cost which may derive from the need of making sense of independent (and contradictory) emergent structure.
Introduction
In a number of publications, Turner and Fauconnier have presented and developed the notion of conceptual integration or blending as a general, dynamic, simple cognitive operation used to construct meaning (see Fauconnier and Turner 1994 ,1996 Turner and Fauconnier, 1995, 1998) . Blending has been found to be pervasive in many áreas of human thought. One of the central characteristics of blending is that it may develop so-called emergent structure, that is to say, conceptual structure which does not exist in any of the input spaces and which is only explainable in terms of tñe blend itself. On occasions, this emergent stracture may be inconsistent with tñe information contained in one or more of the input spaces. This is specially noticeable in the case of counterfactual claims. Nevertheless, as argued by Ruiz de Mendoza (1996 , 1997 , 1999 , postulating the emergence of independent and/or inconsistent structure in the blend is not desirable from the point of view of the psychological adequacy of an account of conceptual integration. Blend-internal asymmetries and inconsistencies are more costly to process in terms of cognitive economy. In an attempt to overeóme this drawback of the canonical theory of blending, Ruiz de Mendoza (1998) suggests that it is possible to explain away apparently inconsistent structure by adequately combining data from as many input spaces as necessary to yield implicated information.
In connection to Ruiz de Mendoza' s observation, in this paper we analyse counterfactual pieces of advice of the type Ifl were you, I would... Turner and Fauconnier (1998: 296) claim that an illocutionary act of this kind involves the construction of a mental space which is contrary-to-iact with respect to both input spaces. As is amply argued in section three, however, the understanding of the intended meaning of these utterances can be derived from the conceptual interaction of one or more metonymies in each the input spaces. Moreover, it is shown that this rich conceptual interaction explains the purported inconsistencies in the blend. The resulting account is free from the cognitive cost which may derive from the need of making sense of independent (and contradictory) emergent structure.
Counterfactual blendings revisited
In their paper on conceptual integration in counterfactuals, Turner and Fauconnier (1998: 288 ff) consider the following prototypical instance of counterfactual claim:
(1) If Churchill had been Prime Minister in 1938 instead of Neville Chamberlain, Hitler would have been deposed and World War II averted.
Their analysis of this counterfactual claim is carried out in terms of the many-space model of conceptual projection. As is well known, the many-space model ofmetaphor or theory of blending differs from the traditional two-domain model (Lakoff 1987 (Lakoff ,1993 Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff and Turner, 1989) in that it explains many cognitive phenomena, including metaphor and metonymy, in terms of conceptual integration of information derived from múltiple mental spaces. In its most simplified form, the many-space model includes at least two input spaces (source and target) and two middle spaces (the generic space and the blended space). The generic space reflects some common abstract structure shared by the input spaces, which licenses the cross-space mapping between the source and the target. The blended space inherits partial structure from the input spaces and may also include emergent structure of its own.
Example (1) draws information from two input spaces. The source domain, in which Churchill is seen as a politician who openly opposes Germán Nazism in 193 8; and the target domain, where Neville Chamberlain is the Prime Minister of England who opts for a policy of appeasement, rather than one of open confrontaüon, towards the threat of Hitler's dictatorship in 1938. A third generic space grants the subsequent conceptual projectionby reflecting structure common to both input domains: politicians holding particular opinions as to what the correct foreign pohcy should be in a certain country at a given point in its history. Finally, the blended space consists of partial structure projected from each of the input spaces, together with some emergent independent information developed within the blend itself. The source domain projects 'Churchill' to the blended space. From the target domain, the blend inherits the role of 'Prime Minister'. Thus, through composition, the projections from the source and the target make new relations available which didn't exit in the sepárate inputs: Churchill is Prime Minister in 193 8. Finally, through completion and elaboration, further new structure emerges: Churchill opposes Germany's foreign policy, World War n is averted, and the holocaust avoided. The following figure schematises this conceptual operation: The resulting contrary-to-fact space displays the standard features of blending as summarised by Turner and Fauconnier (1998: 287-290) . It exploits and develops counterpart connections betweenthe two input spaces in a selective manner. The final blend can be input to other blends (as when Margaret Thatcher argued that just as the Allies should have refused to appease Hitler, so Western leaders should reñise to appease aggressors in the war in Bosnia) and, as shown above, it seems to develop its own emergent structure.
This counterfactual blend is impossible in reality. In spite of this, as pointed out by Tumer and Fauconnier (1998:293) , the lack of analogy between the inputs revealed by the blend makes possible the effective cornmunication of a complex reasoning, namely, the fact that dictatorships and the negative consequences they bring about can only be avoided through open confrontation. It should be noted, however, that this literal paraphrase of (1) does not have the richness of meaning of the counterfectual blend. The paraphrase does not convey the persuasive forcé of (1), because it is not based on previous well-known historical facts. Henee the relevance of blending as a powerful instrument of communication.
This orthodox account of blending has been recently questioned. Although the core of the theory is accepted, Ruiz de Mendoza (1996 ,1997 ,1999 has amply shown that there are two essential problems with Turner and Fauconnier's treatment of blended spaces. The first one is related to the claim that blends créate new idiosyncratic structure of their own. Asymmetries and irregularities are not consistent with the principie of cognitive economy. Since they break the addressee's expectations in unpredictable ways, they require greater cognitive effort to be interpreted. In this connection, Ruiz de Mendoza (1997) has argued that the apparent irregularities in the resulting blends can be accounted for simply by increasing the number of input spaces involved in a projection.
2 The second problem stems from the lack of attention paid to the study of the constraints which opérate on conceptual projection. It is generally accepted that blending should be a principle-regulated phenomenon. Fauconnier and Turner (1998: 280) recognise the following principies underlying the process of blending:
Integration: The blend must constitute a tightly integrated scene that can be manipulated as a unit. Web: Manipulating the blend asa unit must maintain the web of appropriate connections to the input spaces easily and without additional surveillance or computation. Unpacking: The blend alone must enable the understander to unpack the blend to reconstract the inputs, the cross-space mapping, the generic space, and the network of connections between all these spaces. Topology: For any input and any element in that space projected into the blend, it is optimal for the relations of the element in the blend to match the relations of its counterpart. Good reasons: All things being equal, if an element appears in the blend, there will be pressure to find significance for this element. Significance will include relevant links to other spaces and relevant functíons in running the blend.
Some comments are in order. To begin with, it should be noted that some of these principies are in fact a posterior} attributes. Integration, web, unpacking and good reasons describe some requirements which the final blend must fulfil, but they do not specify the properties which the input spaces must have or the constraints which should opérate on the process of blending in order for those final attributes and/or conditíons to hold.
The principie oítopology represente an apriori condition. It seems to be, however, a reformulation of Lakoff s (1990 Lakoff s ( , 1993 well-known Principie oflnvariance, according to which metaphoric mappings preserve the image-schematic structure of the source domain without violating the inherent structure of the target domain. Moreover, this is not the only constraint working on conceptual integration. As noted by Ruiz de Mendoza (1996 , 1997 , there are also pragmatic restrictions placed on blending. One such restrictions is the Principie of Relevance. As a result of the presumption of optimal relevance, blending operations are expected to offer the addressee the máximum number of contextual effects for the mínimum processing effort. In order to achieve this, conceptual projection from the input spaces must obey at least the two following principies (Ruiz de Mendoza, 1996:236):
1. No information which is inconsistent with either the central or any non-central intended assumption can be projected to the blend. 2. Only the mínimum necessary information will be projected to the blend.
Assuming that these principies are obeyed, the hearer is entitled to consider the first acceptable interpretation of the blend as the one the speaker intends to convey.
Going back to example (1), it is now possible to offer an alternative analysis of it along these lines. The blend compües with the two principies just mentioned: only the minimum necessary information has been projected into the blend (i. e. Churchill as a Prime Minister) and no information inconsistent with the central intended assumption has been projected. This entitles the hearer to beüeve that the first acceptable interpretation is the intended one. Apparently, however, the projection from the two inputs creates a counter-to-reality space in which Churchill is Prime Minister in 1938, opposes Hitler, and the World War II does not take place. None of these events took place in real life at that time. Turner and Fauconnier would have argued that this is just inconsistent structure produced by the blend. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that we may interpret the counterfactural claim under consideration in this way. Upon hearing an utterance like (1), hearers intuitively know that the speaker is not suggesting that Churchill was once Prime Minister in a parallel world. What needs to be explained, therefore, is how the hearer is capable of grasping the intended meaning of that utterance, namely, that policies of open opposition are more effective that those of appeasement. I would like to argüe that this interpretation is reached in two stages:
(1) through a conceptual projection from two input spaces, each of which includes a further metonymic model, and (2) by means of the general inferencing capabilities of the human being operating on the resulting blend. Conceptual interaction of additional cognitive models, -metonymic models in the case that occupy us-, explains why counterfactual claims of this kind are not understood in their literal sense and, also, why, in contrast to Turner and Fauconnier's belief that the blend includes contrary-to-reality information, hearers are not puzzled by them.
My suggestion is that the 'Churchill' and the 'Neville Chamberlain' which are mentioned in the counterfectual claim are just the source domains of two metonymies which stand for two types of politicians: those who favour open opposition and those who prefer policies of appeasement respectively. Therefore, the input spaces would be organised as follows: -do not oppose dictators openly -prefer policies of appeasement cognitive economy, they actívate the two types of politician straightaway. From a communicative perspective, together with the instantiation of the two kinds of politician, they bring along a wealth of rich connotations which derives from the personalities of these two statesmen (e.g. Churchill's determination and stubbornness). The rest of the information included in the blend (i. e. the iact that World War II would not have taken place and that the holocaust would have been avoided) are reached via the addressee's general inferential ability. If the kinds of policy represented by Churchill and Neville were opposed, and if the policy represented by Neville led to a war and a holocaust, then ChurchiH's policy would have probably given way to the opposite outcome: no war and no holocaust.
In sum, as the alternative explanation of example (1) shows, the apparent asymmetries which emerge in the blend are far from arbitrary. They can be expected and accounted for by means of (1) a simple conceptual interaction in the form of a metonymic operation within each of the input spaces, and (2) the use of general human inferential abilities.
Conceptual interaction in the understanding of counterfactual pieces of advice
Turner and Fauconnier (1998: 296) rightiy point to the ubiquity of counterfactual blends. One área of everyday reasoning and communication which makes routine and largely unnoticed use of this type of conceptual projection is that involved in giving advice. One of the most common linguistic procedures for the realization of this type of speech act takes the form of a hypothetical conditíonal sentence which, according to Turner and Fauconnier (1998:296) , 'requires intricate, orderly, and impressive blending to créate a counterfactual space'. In the remainder of this paper, I shall analyse several instances of advising to show that their alledged counterfactuality is largely illusory. 4 In doing so, it shall also become apparent that an explanation of these examples along the lines suggested in section 2 is more consistent with the principie of cognitive economy, since in this way, the seeming contradictions which emerge within the blend are accounted for as the output of simple and recurrent patterns of conceptual interaction. Our study has been carried out on a sample of a hundred instances of pieces of advice of the type If I were you... The data have been extracted from the British National Corpus.
Most instances of advising in the sample resemble example (2) below:
(2) The doctor told him: "Iflwere you, I would just pack your job".
The canonical analysis in terms of conceptual projection of this example can be schematised as follows (see next page): The blend creates a parallel reality wbich defies common sense: the doctor becomes the patient and quits the latter's job. The illusion of a counterfactual reality, however, is not so strong in an almost identical utterance like (3) below:
(3) The doctor told him: Tf / were you, 1 would just pack my job'.
The use of the fírst person possessive adjective in (3) hinders the creation of a counterto-fact reaüty. It is obvious that the speaker has not 'become' the addressee, but that be is just puttinglñmselfintheaddressee'sboots and consideringwhathiscourseofaction would be under those circumstances. The collection of data under analysis contains instances of these two types of counterfactual advice: in some cases the possessive adjectives and reflexive pronouns agree in person with the subject (I), while in others the agreement is established with the second person pronoun (you). Letus consider them in more detail:
Subject agreement
(4) Ifl were you, I'd watch my step.
(5) 'Maybe not, but ifl were you, Miss Williams, Fá make sure that / confined myselfXo facts in future, and the most pressing one of all is the fact that someone in this town is annoyed with you!' (6) 'Someone paid them good money, a lot of money, to do that... this so-called 'friend' they mentioned... so ifl were you, I'd be trying to work out who he is rather than getting on my soapbox.'
Complement agreement (7) And, ifl were you, I wouldn't bother resting on your very dusty laurels.
(8) 'Ifl were you, I would hop out now while you can,' Nicola said. (9) / shouldn't bother yourself ifl were you.
The subtle differences in the use of possessive adjective and pronoun agreement inthose sentences has significant meaning consequences. Those examples which display complement agreement are perceived as more powerful and pressing pieces of advice. This obeys to the fact that, although in a kind of ambiguous way, they present the addressee as somehow involved in the carrying out of the future action. Examples (4) to (6), on the contrary, do not explicitly point to the involvement of the addressee in the predicated action.
More important, however, it is to note the fact that the existence of pieces of advice like (4) to (6) suggests that the counterfactuality of If-l-were-you advice constructions is only apparent. In processing these sentences, the addressee, of course, does not think of the speaker as actually becoming himself/herself. Let us now explain in detail the cognitive operations which underlie the interpretation of those pieces of advice and which prevent the hearer from getting trapped in a mental space packed with contradictory information.
The potential contradictions in the blend vanish simply by postulating a metonymic operation in each of the input spaces. Example (2), which is reproduced below as (10) for convenience, is analysed in this fashion (see figure four on following page):
(10) The doctor toldhim: 'lflwereyou, /would justpackycwjob'.
These mappings show that the expression Tf I were you...' is simply metonymically standing for Tf I were in your circumstances...' That is to say, the speaker pictures himself in the circumstances in which the addressee needs to decide on a future course of action. However, the speaker does not cease to be himself and that is why he can make use of his knowledge and make a decisión (i.e. to quit working).
When subject agreement is involved, we find a similar metonymic operation which only differs from the one in figure 4 as regards the scope of the target in the second input space. (11) This is the case with example (3),which is reproduced here as (11) and which could be represented as follows (see figure five above):
(11) If I were you, I would pack wy job.
While example (10) emphasises the idea of 'quitting a job of the kind of the addressee's (that specific job may be too stressful, little rewardirig, etc.), in (11) the emphasis is placed on the action of just 'quitting one's job' (the addressee may be too stressed out and in need of some time to rest).
The metonymic operation described within the blended spaces of examples (10) and (11) The use of the plural emphatic pronounyoH both precludes the building of aparallel reality, since a situation in which the speaker is transformed into two different people at the same time is even more difficult to imagine. In contrast, two metonymic mappings like those proposed for examples (10) and (11), in which the speaker stands for his own circumstances and the addressees stand for theirs, leads to the correct understanding that the speaker has not been transformed into anyone, but that he is just putting himself in someone else's shoes.
Let us fínish this discussion on the role of conceptual interaction in the interpretation of the illocutionary act of advising by considering the following puzzling example:
(13) If 1 were you, I'd get in touch with me if sometning turned up. In a situation of that kind, you'd need someone who can keep a secret.
If the previous analysis of examples (10) and (11) is applied to this utterance, we may paraphrase it luce this: If I were in a situation Hice the one you arefacing, I would get in touch with me ifsomething turned up. Still, the utterance does not make sense. What is the point in 'me getting in touch with myself in order to solve a problem? Our knowledge about prototypical human behaviour tells us that, if one is in trouble, one usually asks someone else for help. Nevertheless, the sentence can be made sense of by positing a double metonymic mapping: the first person pronoun me is the source domain of a metonymy in which the speaker makes himself stand for some of his attributes, namely, the fact that he is a trustworthy, reliable person. In turn, these attributes stand for the whole class of people who have such features: 
Conclusions
In the present paper, I have argued against positing the existence of inconsistent emergent stracture in blended spaces in the specific case of so-called counterfactual advising. I have shown that the apparent contradictions that have been attributed to counterfactual claims of tais kind can be made sense of simply by developing the stracture of the input or blended spaces involved. More specifically, it has been contended that the metonymic mappings which opérate within those mental spaces lie at basis of the understanding of these illocutionary acts. In addition, as has been illustrated, diese recurrent metonymic operations explain the fact that speakers are not puzzled by the apparent contradictions which are associated with counterfactual claims. Since speakers do not need to invest any time or cognitive effort in disentangling blend-internal asymmetries and inconsistencies, the present refüiernent of the canonical theory of blending represents a step forward towards the achievement of an optimal degree of psychological adequacy. Notes 1. Financial support for this research has been given by the DGES, grant no. BFF2000-0934, Ministry of Education and Culture, Spain.
2. Ruiz de Mendoza (1996 , 1997 , 1999 has reanalysed some of Turner and Fauconnier's most well-known examples of blending to show that inconsistencies are not such. They can be made sense of either as contextual implications or as the output of more complex cognitive operations involving a greater number of cognitive models. Example (1) is analysed below in this fashion.
3. It should be taken into account that in the example under consideration, the illusion of the existence of a counterfactual paral leí reality is aided by the fact that Churchill and Neville both li ved during the same time span, and therefore, Churchill actually had a real chance at that time to have become the Prime Minister instead of Neville Chamberlain. An utterance like Ifl had been Julius Caesar, the Gaulles would have never been conqueren, where it is obvious that I was never and could have never been Julius Caesar, on the contrary, does not lead to the creation of a counterfactual reality so straightforwardly.
4. This study has been carried out on a sample of a hundred instances of pieces of advice of the type Ifl were you... The data have been extracted from the British National Corpus.
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